Page 14 - Flipmag-01

UAV Countermeasures

tected and its location/flight path de- miniaturized, low power FM continu-
termined. Second, it must be ous wave radar in a small package
stopped, diverted or destroyed. In the that can be placed on a drone or at
CUAS business these problems are ground locations around a protected
called “detection” and “mit igation”. site (potentially even a city). Net-
You can further break detection worked together, the small radars can
down into passive and active meth- provide airspace awareness both at
ods. The most basic approach is vi- the perimeter and in a complete arc,
sual, using cameras, scopes and eye- or “dome”, above the site. Combined
balls to detect approaching drones. with other sensor input and AI, the
Visual detection is passive, gener- company says TrueView offers aware-
ally avoiding interference with other ness beyond simple drone detection.
systems or people. “That’s why SkyDome was created,
But small drones are hard to see. That to maintain a persistent view of
has led to development of other passive what’s happening in an airspace for
approaches including a cou stic, infra red An artist’s rendering of the protective AI-enabled SkyDome all kinds of drones,” says Fortem CEO,
over a stadium in Jakarta, Indonesia. SkyDome offers 180-
and RF mon itoring systems. The latter ef- degree horizon-to-horizon detection around the entirety of Timothy Bean. He adds that non-
fectively ‘listen’ for radio signals from a the facility. (Fortem Technologies) emitting drones are detected as well.
drone’s pilot (via a controller) to the “In a criminal situation, there’s often
drone. They may also eventually take data may leave drones to fly uncontrolled. no RF to detect. Our system uses physics
from an FAA-approved database system Defeating encryption puts the impetus to detect everything in the airspace.”
called “Remote Identification” which could (and responsibility) for drone control on
require small UAS to broadcast ID data from the CUAS provider. Geofencing may re- The Authority Bottleneck
an onboard transponder or transmit in real- strict legitimate commercial or civil serv- Measuring the effectiveness of layered
time to an internet network. ice activity. Legal limitations impact de- systems like SkyDome is difficult in the
With Remote ID yet to be realized tection and mitigation systems as well. U.S. aside from test scenarios because as
and physical limits on the effective Fortem’s layered drone defense is of late 2019, only the federal government
range of many passive systems, there’s a brought together in its SkyDome sys- is permitted to employ CUAS systems.
place for active methods too, princi- tem, an adaptable AI platform that fuses The 2018 Federal Aviation Administra-
pally radar. Though it can be affected by the company’s TrueView® radar and tion Reauthorization Act gave the Depart-
line-of-sight issues, radar can effectively other sensors (optical, thermal) to au- ment of Homeland Security and Justice
spot small drones including those tonomously monitor an environment in Department the right to “disrupt,” “exer-
which may be partially autonomous or three dimensions. The use of AI to clas- cise control of” or “seize or otherwise
non-emitting – the sort malicious actors sify objects and patterns in its airspace confiscate” drones deemed a “credible
might use. However, distinguishing a allows clients to dismiss many targets threat” without a warrant. Those provi-
small UAS from a bird with radar alone (including drones) which don’t present sions will likely face legal challenges and
is difficult. That problem can be over- a threat, reducing the false-positive they do little to clarify the commercial
come by pairing radar with artificial in- problem common to CUAS systems. market where shooting down or dis-
telligence (AI) enabled software. When the system detects and antici- abling drones remains illegal. There is no
Mitigation can be kinetic or non-ki- pates a threat, it can alert personnel or liability framework for such operations.
netic. The former generally means shoot- launch one of the company’s Drone- Likewise, there is no CUAS certification
ing down the drone with a gun or laser, Hunter® interceptors to neutralize danger- regime and thus no standard against
or capturing it with a net. Non-kinetic ous or malicious drones. Fortem can con- which to measure the relative perform-
methods include jamming (breaking the figure DroneHunter on a variety of drone ance of the systems now offered.
link between controller and drone), cyber platforms depending on the interceptor “The biggest thing we need is regula-
manipulation (breaking drone encryp- performance the customer requires. When tory clarity,” Fortem CTO, Adam Robert-
tion and taking control) or geofencing launched, the interceptor leverages son affirms. “What are the issues with
(designating areas into which cooperative Fortem’s TrueView radar to autonomously collateral damage? If you light up an RF
drones are programmed not to fly). detect, pursue and capture the offending countermeasure in an airport environ-
Kinetic and non-kinetic mitigation drone(s) with its onboard net-capture ef- ment for example, are you going to do
approaches come with undesirable side fector. Firing a net, rather than destroying more harm than good? Does a govern-
effects. Shooting a drone down may or diverting the malicious drone, allows ment guy have to press the button?
cause collateral damage as it falls, or for forensic analysis of the craft. Could a contractor operate [a CUAS sys-
from missing the target. Jamming Though other CUAS providers offer tem] in a proxy situation? Could we
drones can disable other nearby systems radar-based detection, Fortem’s net- have counter UAS-as-a-service?”
from mobile phones to radio communi- worked radar departs from typical single Even passive detection systems could
cations and radar. Breaking control links location radar arrays. TrueView is a run afoul of American law. The federal

12 www.aerodefensetech.com Aerospace & Defense Technology, May 2020